Siberia, Environmentalism, and Problems of Environmental Protection by Rosencranz, Armin & Scott, Antony
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 14 | Number 4 Article 8
1-1-1991




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Armin Rosencranz and Antony Scott, Siberia, Environmentalism, and Problems of Environmental Protection, 14 Hastings Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 929 (1991).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol14/iss4/8
Siberia, Environmentalism, and Problems
of Environmental Protection
By ARMI ROSENCRANZ* AND ANTONY SCOT**
I. INTRODUCTION
Siberia contains the world's largest undeveloped open space.1 It
comprises one-tenth of the world's land mass, but is populated by a mere
thirty million people. Vast areas are completely pristine, including some
of the world's largest forests, which contain one-flfth of the earth's forest
cover,2 and one-third of the earth's coniferous forests.3 These forests
cover an area the size of the continental United States.4
Large herds of reindeer roam on Siberia's tundra. Lake Baikal, the
world's largest lake, which holds twenty percent of the world's (and
eighty percent of the Soviet Union's) fresh water, is also in Siberia. The
lake is home to 1500 plant and animal species, 1200 of which exist no-
where else.5 The open space of Siberia thus represents a unique environ-
mental resource for the USSR and the entire world.
The long term integrity and health of Siberia's environment is in
jeopardy, however, because the natural riches that give Siberia its ecolog-
ical importance invite exploitation. Timber operations have degraded the
environment, and it seems likely that timber extraction and clearcutting
will accelerate.6 Huge hydroelectric projects have been planned for, or
* Director of Pacific Energy and Resources Center;, Professor, School of Natural Re-
sources, University of California, Berkeley; Ph.D. 1970, LL.B. 1970, Stanford University; A.B.
1958, Princeton University.
** Director of Research, Pacific Energy and Resources Center, B.A. 1987, University of
California, Berkeley.
1. We use the term "Siberia" to indicate the entire region of the USSR that lies East of
the Ural Mountains, including the Soviet Far East.
2. Zimmerman & Briggs, Bitter Winds Blow Through Siberia, Christian Sci Monitor,
Jan. 11, 1989, at 18; see also B. BARR & K. BRADEIN, THE DLSAPPEARiNG RussLAN Foaasr
39 (1988).
3. B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 1.
4. Geniella, L-P Looking at Soviet Timber, The Press Democrat, June 15, 1990, at Al,
col. 1.
5. Davidson, Polk Environment No. 1 Soviet Worry, San Francisco Exam., Nov. 22,
1989, at A1O, col. 1, All, col. 1.
6. See generally B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2.
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are already placed in, Siberiia.7 The effluent from gigantic saw, pulp, and
paper mills threatens the life of Lake Baikal.'
Siberia also contains two-thirds of the USSR's gas and oil reserves,9
as well as large quantities of coal, diamonds, and precious metals. These
resources generate twenty billion dollars in revenues, or roughly half of
all Soviet hard currency receipts.1" Thus, there are intense pressures to
increase the exploitation of Siberian resources, despite the threat of eco-
logical disaster."
It is as unrealistic to hope that the pressures to exploit Siberia's re-
sources will abate as it is foolhardy to assume the Siberian environment
can support unrestricted development. How much land is to be pre-
served, how much is to be developed, and the nature and scope of the
developments, are crucial questions.
This Article will try to provide a context within which these ques-
tions can be addressed. It will first touch on some of the historical inade-
quacies of the Soviet legal and regulatory systems, and on the nature of
opposition to environmentally damaging projects. The Article will then
explore the current state of Siberian local economies, and the threat that
economic joint ventures pose to these economies and the environment.
This will be followed by a brief examination of the promise of economic
and political decentralization. Finally, the Article will propose some
guidelines for preserving Siberia's environment.
H. THE PAST: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
EXPLOITATION AND LOCAL RESISTANCE
A. The Centralized Production System
The system which governs production and resource extraction in the
Soviet Union seems to have contributed greatly to environmental degra-
dation. Industrial production in the USSR has taken place under the
aegis of centralized production ministries. These ministries set nation-
wide production quotas that are allocated through the individual state-
run enterprises. In an attempt to raise the standard of living in the
7. Peterson, State of the Environment; Part III: The Water, Radio Free Europe Daily
Rep.: Munich, Feb. 19, 1990.
8. Stewart, The Lake is in Great Peril, NEW ScIENTcsT, June 30, 1990, at 58-62,
9. Sagers, Moe, Green, & Castberg, Prospects for Soviet Gas Exports: Opportunities and
Constraints, 29 SOvIET GEOGRAPHY 881, 882 (1988).
10. Interview with Paul Hoosin, Professor of Geography, University of California, Berke-
ley (Nov. 21, 1990) [hereinafter Interview with Paul Hoosin].
11. See generally Edwards, Siberia in From the Cold, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 1990, at
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USSR, production quotas have historically been set at unrealistically
high levels. Individual factory managers are pressured to meet these in-
flated targets.
Historically, each ministry had its own environmental production
unit which has set the ministry environmental policy. 2 Local authorities
are then responsible for setting more specific standards, but the responsi-
bility for meeting both production quotas and specific environmental reg-
ulations lies with the individual enterprises run by the central production
ministries. Local governing bodies have therefore been in the untenable
position of setting standards for, but having no real authority over, pol-
luting enterprises which take their orders from the production minis-
tries.13 Thus, the disincentives for pollution have been and continue to
remain small. Environmental protection seems to fall by the wayside as
factory managers scramble to meet their production quotas.
The advent of Perestroika, the Soviet Union's recent policy of eco-
nomic restructuring, brought with it an attempt to change the environ-
mental regulatory system. A new agency, Goskompriroda, 1 was formed
in 1988 to oversee all environmental regulation and enforcement. 15 Un-
fortunately, Goskompriroda has not been very successful since it suffers
from a lack of status, legal authority, jurisdiction, and funding.' 6
The chairman of Goskompriroda is but one of fifty members in the
Council of Ministries. Frequently in the minority, Goskompriroda has no
recourse if a decision of the Council of Ministers goes against it. It can,
and sometimes does, conduct environmental impact assessments. How-
ever, if a polluter refuses to accept Goskompriroda's negative impact as-
sessment and brings the matter to the Council, the Council generally
overrules the new agency. 17 While Goskompriroda can levy fines against
polluting enterprises, the fines are too small-only 100 rubles-to deter
pollution.1
8
Goskompriroda has been further hampered by the individual pro-
12. Robinson, Soviet Environmental Law and Perestroika, ENVT'L POL. & L. 224, 225
(1988).
13. K. Franchuk, The Roots of Environmental Disruption in the Soviet Union 11 (1990)
(unpublished manuscript).
14. Translated literally, Gaskompriroda means the Committee on Environmental
Protection.
15. Robinson, supra note 12, at 225.
16. W. Freeman, The Politics of Environmental Protection in the USSR The Case of the
Soviet EPA 3 (Sept. 22, 1989) (unpublished research memorandum for the U.S. Information
Agency) [hereinafter W. Freeman, Politics of Environmental Protection].
17. Id at 3-4.
18. Edwards, supra note 11, at 20.
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duction ministries, which have tenaciously held onto their environmental
authority, including their authority over air and water pollution, and for-
est protection, although such functions were supposed to have been ab-
sorbed into Goskompriroda.19 By stalling for time, and shifting
bureaucrats and money to nonenvironmental units, the production min-
istries have refused to reveal the extent of their resources.20 The indiffer-
ence of these entrenched bureaucracies to the environment has been hard
to overcome.
Goskompriroda's legal authority is still not defined by any basic doe-
ument.2' While it has used environmental impact statements to close
down some of the worst polluters and to prevent the building of certain
new facilities, Goskompriroda has done so without any firm legal basis.
22
One such closure astonished former Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov,
since the matter had not first been addressed by the central
government.23
Finally, Goskompriroda is inadequately funded.24 Production com-
petes with pollution control for scarce resources, and in current eco-
nomic conditions, Goskompriroda gets squeezed."5 The agency does not
have sufficient staff or equipment to adequately monitor polluters, nor
does it possess hard, convertible currency. Thus, though it is responsible
for bringing "clean," state-of-the-art technologies and monitoring equip-
ment to the Soviet Union,26 Goskompriroda has no funds to import such
foreign products.27
The ineffectiveness of Goskompriroda and of the Soviet regulatory
system in general, coupled with the priority production takes over envi-
ronmental protection, have led to a reckless exploitation of Siberian re-
sources. The absence of cultural ties connecting most Soviet
policymakers to the vast Siberian lands28 may also have contributed to a
vision of Siberia as merely an open waste land to be exploited.
19. Robinson, supra note 12, at 225.
20. Id. at 226.
21. W. Freeman, Politics of Environmental Protection, supra note 16, at 4.
22. Id
23. W. Freeman, Environmental Issues in the USSR Supreme Soviet (Jan. 25, 1990) (un-
published research memorandum for the U.S. Information Agency).
24. W. Freeman, Politics of Environmental Protection, supra note 16, at 3-4.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Robinson, supra note 12, at 225.
27. E. Green, Ecology and Perestroika: Environmental Protection in the Soviet Union 59
(1990) (report prepared for the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations).
28. Interview with Paul Hoosin, supra note 10.
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B. Local Environmental Activism
Despite the central government's production priorities, Siberian
Russians and regional natives have occasionally successfully halted de-
velopment projects. Arising from a deeply felt connection to the land,29
their concern for the environment has sometimes managed to neutralize
the interests of the production ministries.
Recently, for example, native Siberians have been instrumental in
halting a major expansion of natural gas development on the Yamal Pe-
ninsula.3 0 Yamal's natural gas reserves are huge,31 and production min-
istries have looked to them for both export and domestic supply.32
However, the peninsula is ecologically fragile, and some scientists believe
that intensive development could cause it to simply melt away. 3" Ex-
isting projects have already caused major devastation. Thirteen million
acres of grazing land have been lost,34 and the reindeer population has
shrunk by at least half. This has been devastating to the Siberian natives,
the Yamal Nentsy, who have depended on the free-roaming reindeer for
sustenance for countless centuries.
When the Nentsy learned of the planned natural gas development,
they mounted a protest. Numbering only 5000, the Yamal Nentsy never-
theless convinced local officials to take their case to Moscow,35 where
they found support among the growing corps of Soviet environmental-
ists. Although that 1.2 billion dollars had already been invested, the cen-
tral ministries' plans for drilling and building were successfully resisted,
and the project has been stopped, albeit temporarily. 36 As a result of the
protest, Moscow has ordered a review of the Yamal development plans,
including their impact upon the Nentsy.
Environmentalists were similarly able to halt a centrally planned
project to divert the waters of Siberia's northward-flowing rivers to irri-
gate the arable land in the country's southern regions. Construction on
the Northern Rivers project was initiated in 1980, despite technical, eco-
nomic, and scientific feasibility studies which indicated that the project
was extremely suspect.37 The infrastructure for the plan, including pro-
29. Id
30. Edwards, supra note 11, at 10.
31. Sagers, Moe, Green, & Castberg, supra note 9, at 884.
32. Id. at 884-85.
33. Edwards, supra note 11, at 10.
34. Id at 39.
35. Id at 10.
36. Id
37. Interview with Taras Kalinichenko, Research Fellow for the Institute of State and
Law, USSR Academy of Sciences (Aug. 14, 1990).
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ject-based towns and electric generating stations, was hastily assembled.
Because no money had been officially appropriated for the project, this
preliminary construction violated Soviet law. To remedy the situation,
the Communist Party Congress passed a resolution retroactively legiti-
mizing the construction.
Shortly thereafter environmental groups began to protest. They
pointed out the disastrous consequences which would flow from the pro-
ject. More than six million hectares would be inundated, water supplies
for the cities of Wloyda and Shola would be flooded, many cultural sites
would be submerged, and climate changes could occur. Though the en-
vironmental opposition continued to grow in subsequent years, the power
of the Central Ministries, especially the Ministries of Water Resources
and Agriculture, overwhelmed all opposition. Further development
plans were railroaded through the Central Committee of the Communist
Party (CCCP) and the Council of Ministers.
After President Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985, the
USSR Academy of Sciences created a special commission to investigate
large-scale land reclamation projects. This commission studied the
Northern Rivers project and concluded that the socioeconomic and eco-
logical problems which it would cause made the project absolutely unfea-
sible. While the CCCP accepted this recommendation, the work of the
Central Ministries continued unabated. Finally, in 1988 a legal analysis
was conducted which ascertained which laws had been violated by the
planning and construction of the project. In the wake of this report, the
CCCP and the Council of Ministers ultimately halted work on the
project.
Stopping this gigantic water transfer project represents a remarkable
success on several fronts. Besides preventing an environmental catastro-
phe, it demonstrated the pressure that local environmentalists could
mount and sustain. However, it also illustrated the influence of those in
authority and the necessity of eliciting official alliances. The independent
project evaluation, and subsequent legal evaluation, by the members of
the Academy of Sciences were critical to the project's suspension. More-
over, it was not until Gorbachev came to power that the project was
stopped. Gorbachev has been quite responsive to environmental causes.
Under President Leonid Brezhnev's tenure, the Central Ministries had
been able to keep the project alive despite popular protest and the clear
illegality of their actions.
In short, environmental activism is a necessary, but by no means
sufficient, engine of change. Given enough clamor, coupled with the
[Vol. 14
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right sympathies at high levels, environmentally destructive projects may
be stopped.
C. Central Government Power
The Yamal Peninsula gas exploration and the Northern Rivers di-
version project are strikingly similar in important respects. Both projects
were halted despite the fact that large amounts of money had already
been spent by the government. The opposition to both projects was
sparked by local environmentalists, and was only successful when influ-
ential members of the central government took up the cause.
While no action would have occurred without the initiative of local
environmentalists, these cases highlight the overarching importance of
central government priorities. Under Brezhnev, both the gas exploration
in the Yamal and the Northern Rivers project proceeded despite known
risks. Both projects were stopped when Gorbachev came to power. It
appears that the differing agendas of these leaders, and the people close
to them, ultimately determined the success of the opposition
movements.38
In the future, the political influence of environmentalists is likely to
increase with the decentralization of political authority and its disburse-
ment to the republics, because it will be easier to mount political pressure
against local leaders than against far-off figures in Moscow. The struc-
tural changes now occurring in the Soviet Union may thus decrease the
vulnerability of environmental causes to the whims of the central govern-
ment leadership.
I1l. THE PRESENT: JOINT VENTURES AND THE
THREAT OF UNREGULATED DEVELOPMENT
A. The Push for Siberia's Economic Development
Soviet planners have long desired to develop Siberia. 9 The impetus
to develop a Siberian infrastructure has come in part from the Soviet
Union's substantially increased military presence in the Soviet Far East
since the mid-1960s. The military buildup was sparked by both the
38. Despite T. Kalinichenko's claims, the force of law does not seem to be the deciding
causal factor in stopping the rivers project. Rather, the decision to adhere to the law, and the
attendant environmental and political agenda that goes with this, were the deciding factors.
39. See B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 64-68.
40. Bradshaw, Soviet Asian-Pacific Trade and the Regional Development of the Soviet Far
East, 29 SoViET GEOGRAPHY 367, 368 (1988).
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Sino-Soviet split,41 and more recently has been fueled by the Soviet per-
ception of the region's importance for projecting power into the Pacific
Rim.42
Soviet planners have had an ideological interest in the settlement,
and resulting development of Siberia,43 because it represents the fulfill-
ment of the dual Leninist ideals of spreading industrialism and subju-
gating nature.44
Finally, Soviet central planners have desired to make use of Siberia's
vast natural wealth. Development of Siberian natural resources has
presented an opportunity to build both the local and the Soviet econo-
mies." Thus, Stalin reportedly was "obsessed" with the completion of
the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railway to open the region to eco-
nomic development and resource exploitation.' 6 All of the Soviet
Union's natural diamonds and over half of its gold47 come from Siberia,
and the BAM has now made 1.4 billion cubic meters of high quality
timber newly accessible.48
Siberian resources are also given preferential -tax treatment. The tax
per cubic meter of wood from remote Siberian forests is one tenth that
placed on the Russian Republic's most accessible timber, for example.
49
B. Failure in Siberian Development
The exploitation of Siberian resources has not benefitted local econ-
omies, however. While state plans in the 1970s and early 1980s called for
the continued development of natural resources, the concentration on re-
source extraction truncated the Siberian economy,50 which is now based
on the export of raw, unprocessed materials, and the import of capital
and manufactured products.51 Sixty percent of forest product shipments
41. Id at 370.
42. L. DIENES, SOVIET ASIA: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL POLICY
CHOICES 95-99 (1987).
43. K. Franchuk, supra note 13, at 2.
44. C. ZIEGLER, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE USSR 8 (1987).
45. Address by M.S. Gorbachev at the Meeting for the Presentation of the Order of Lcnin
to Vladivostok (Aug. 27, 1986) [hereinafter Gorbachev Address], reprinted in Gorbachev Ac.
cents Soviet Role in Asia, CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PREsS, Aug. 27, 1986, at 1, 4.
46. Dobbs, Stalin's Dream, Russia's Nightmare: The Controversial Debut of the New
Trans-Siberia Railroad, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1989, at 10, col. 3 (nat'l weekly ed.),
47. Bradshaw, supra note 40, at 370.
48. Barr, The Forest Sector of the Soviet Far East: A Revdew and Summary, 30 SOvInT
GEOGRAPHY 283, 292 (1989).
49. B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 72.
50. See Bradshaw, supra note 40, at 372.
51. Id at 368.
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from the Soviet Far East to Soviet domestic markets consists of unmilled
timber."2 Forest Industry Minister Busygin has indicated that only one-
fourth of the forest sector exports consist of chemically and mechanically
processed products.53
With such a small local manufacturing base, the Soviet Far East
must import ninety-five percent of all its iron products.-' Moreover, the
local manufacturing sector has been poorly coordinated with the extrac-
tive sectors of the economy. For example, combine harvesters, which
Siberians have little use for, are produced in the region and exported,
while mining equipment is imported."
The local economy's focus on raw material export is due to several
factors. First, the authorities have not committed the needed capital to
develop a significant manufacturing base. 6 Other public investments in
the region, such as the construction of the BAM, have created more im-
mediate needs. 'By generating an influx of workers, BAM has greatly
exacerbated the local housing shortage. Housing space in Siberia is less
than one-third of the Soviet norm. 7
Secondly, many laborers have been unwilling to permanently relo-
cate to Siberia, and to embrace its harsh living conditions. This has pre-
vented the establishment of a large and stable work force to drive a
Siberian building program.58 Workers who do come to Siberia typically
do not stay,5 9 and thus there is a sixty percent turnover in the construc-
tion labor force in the Soviet Far East each year.'
The structure of the Siberian economy is unlikely to change any
time soon.61 There is a perception among central government leaders
that it is highly desirable to develop the manufacturing sectors of the
Siberian economy.62 But such development would be very expensive.
52. Barr, supra note 48, at 295.
53. B. Barr, The Soviet Forest Sector, Now and in the Future: Too Much Glasnost, Too
Little Perestroika? 17 (Jan. 19, 1989) (H.R. MacMillan Lectureship in Forestry) [hereinafter
B. Barr, Too Much Glasnost?].
54. L. DroNES, supra note 42, at 89.
55. See Bradshaw, supra note 40.
56. See Dienes, A Comment on the New Development Program for the Far East Economic
Region, 29 Sovm'r GEOGRAPHY 420, 421 (1988) [hereinafter Dienes, New Development
Program].
57. Id
58. B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 71.
59. Edwards, supra note 11, at 13.
60. Singur, The Far East Comprehensive Development of Productive Forces, PLANovoYE
KHOZYAYSTRO (No. 3) 94-98 (1988).
61. See Dienes, New Development Program, supra note 56.
62. Gorbachev Address, supra note 45.
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Development of Siberian forest processing facilities could cost 2 to 2.5
times more than in the European regions of the country. 63 Since the
goals ofperestroika favor a restructuring of the manufacturing heartland
of the USSR rather than the remote resource-rich frontiers, 64 the eco-
nomic and political constraints do not portend large domestic investment
in Siberian materials processing industries, or in housing.
In fact, the central government is likely to actively discourage the
development of Siberian infrastructure, and Siberian natural resources
are likely to continue to serve the political, economic, and social "center"
of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Possibly,
large-scale harvesting and unprocessed export of Siberian forests could
be used to cover the mistakes of forestry policies that led to the denuding
of the USSR's western regions, since a policy of massive and accelerated
export of Siberian logs could provide time for the Soviet economy to or-
ganize a sustained yield forestry system in the European-Uralian zone
over the next thirty to fifty years.65 In fact, current Siberian forest use
focuses on satisfying export demand for unmilled timber in the rest of the
USSR.66
The paucity of funds for development, combined with the economic
and political needs of the European regions of the USSR, indicate that
domestic investment in the Siberian infrastructure will remain small.
However, recent plans for the development of Siberia include the use of
economic joint ventures to help capitalize infrastructure.67 Indeed, the
central government has recently actively encouraged joint ventures in Si-
beria by dropping restrictions on the share of operations that can be for-
eign-owned.68
Joint ventures with the Pacific Rim nations make particular sense.
69
Because of lower transportation costs, export of' Siberian resources to
such countries is actually more economic than use in the western regions
of the USSR.70 Intra-USSR Siberian exports must travel 3000 kilometers
by rail, whereas exports to the Pacific Rim can be transported by much
less expensive merchant ships. This is especially true in the case of ex-
ports to Japan. Moreover, foreign firms have the capital and the knowl-
63. B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 73.
64. Bradshaw, supra note 40, at 373.
65. B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 73.
66. Barr, supra note 48, at 288.
67. See B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 203-07.
68. B. Barr, Too Much Glasnost?, supra note 53, at 17.




edge to efficiently exploit Siberian natural resources.7 1 This can benefit
both the "center," which receives the economic advantage of joint ven-
ture exports,72 and the Siberian local economy, which can obtain much
needed materials processing equipment.7 3 The expansion of joint ven-
tures is likely to affect the Siberian economy and environment.
C. Economic Impact of Joint Ventures on Local Economies
The development of Siberian local economies would obviously in-
crease if raw materials were processed before export.74 However joint
ventures promote the export of raw materials. Timber, for instance, is
the largest commodity for Soviet export to Japan, comprising nearly
twenty-five percent of this region's exports in 1985.71 But, eighty-five
percent of this wood is unmilled.7 6 For complex reasons, it seems un-
likely that foreign companies will seek to develop extensive processing
facilities in Siberia.
In the first place, by engaging in resource extracting, as opposed to
processing, industries can minimize the difficulties of doing business in
the Soviet Union. Because resource extracting industries do not require
extensive plant and product management, they do not rely heavily on
modem business tools, such as reliable telephone links, fax and copy ma-
chines, and personal computers, which are either difficult or impossible
to secure in the Soviet Union.77 Noting the organizational difficulties
likely to be encountered in the USSR, the president of a U.S. consulting
firm has advised that "joint ventures should consider the capital intensive
branches of the economy, [which do not] requir[e] a quality of works and
a western style of management.
'17
A second reason that foreign companies will not enter into resource
processing industries in Siberia is that it is in their economic interest to
continue to rely on resource extraction. Resource processing in Siberia
requires large-scale importation of equipment, training, and manage-
ment.7 9 It is generally easier and cheaper for companies instead to bring
the raw materials to extant processing facilities. Regarding setting up op-
erations in the Soviet Union, one wood processing entrepreneur said, "It
71. See B. BAR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 203-07.
72. Interview with Paul Hoosin, supra note 10.
73. B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 207.
74. B. Barr, Too Much Glasnost?, supra note 53, at 17.
75. Bradshaw, supra note 40, at 383.
76. Id
77. See E. Green, supra note 27, at 59-60.
78. Y. Vanous, Economicheskaya Gazeta (No. 34/23) (1988).
79. See B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 73.
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will take a long time and you have to spend a lot of money up front,
before you see some type of return."" ° Thus, many timber companies are
focusing on the exportation of raw logs. As Louisiana Pacific spokesman
Shep Tucher has stated, "We [are] not interested in developing infra-
structure for them."8"
Finally, the Soviet Union's lax environmental regulatory system,
and the possibility of conducting operations relatively unhindered, may
be another attraction to foreign resource extracting industries.
Unfortunately for local Siberian economies, the central Soviet gov-
ernment does not require that foreign firms engaged in joint ventures
invest in manufacturing and materials-processing facilities. Thus, in the
near term, joint ventures provide the best opportunity for large-scale ex-
ploitation of Siberian natural resources. The dependence of the USSR's
European regions on Siberian-generated wealth is confirmed by the fact
that Siberia accounts for eighty percent of the USSR's exports to Japan,
whereas only twenty-five percent of Soviet imports from Japan are allo-
cated to Siberia.82 The recent lowering of foreign ownership restrictions
and the willingness of the central government to step up the export of
unmilled logs to stem hard currency shortages83 does not auger well for
foreign investment in Siberian processing facilities.
D. Environmental Impacts of Joint Ventures
Joint venture operations in Siberia thus threaten the region's envi-
ronment, as resource extracting industries often pollute heavily and are
environmentally destructive. This is evident in clearcutting operations,
strip and leachate mining, and gas and oil drilling in environmentally
sensitive areas. Because joint ventures in Siberia often focus on resource
extraction, adverse environmental effects are almost inevitable.
The intrinsic problem is compounded, however, by Siberian ecosys-
tems and climatic conditions. Siberian tundra is especially sensitive to
the movement of heavy vehicles and equipment, which are integral to gas
and oil operations.8 4 The Siberian climate is cold and makes growing
conditions for timber especially harsh." Indeed, the average diameter of
mature trees in Siberia is only twenty-four centimeters.8 6 Thus, regrowth
80. Robertson, Soviet Future for Bohemia?, Eugene Register-Guard, June 7, 1990, at 13.
81. Geniela, supra note 4, at Al, col. 5.
82. Bradshaw, supra note 40, at 386-87.
83. Geniella, supra note 4, at Al, col. 5.
84. See Edwards, supra note 11, at 16.
85. See B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 84-91.
86. IdL at 72.
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after timber harvesting is very slow, and the erosion caused by clearcut-
ting is compounded.
Environmental destruction from joint venture operations will proba-
bly be compounded by the prevailing lax environmental standards in the
Soviet Union. In the forestry industry, for example, cutting practices in
all regions of the USSR are unsatisfactory from an environmental view-
point."7 Ninety percent of all logging is done by clear or concentrated
cutting methods.88 These methods harm the environment by irrevocably
altering ecosystems, increasing erosion and stream siltation, 9 and inhib-
iting forest regrowth."° Moreover, the natural regeneration that does oc-
cur is often destroyed during fire salvage or thinning operations. 91
Messieurs Braden and Barr have concluded that "[Siberian] timber utili-
zation is essentially viewed as a mining operation with little long-term
consideration for the environment.,
92
Moreover, much of Siberian timber lies on mountainous slopes.
While the felling of timber growing on steep slopes has historically been
limited to twelve percent of the Soviet Union's annual cut,93 there are
current plans to increase this production to fifty percent. 94 This is disas-
trous for the environment. The soil erosion resulting from clear and
comprehensive cutting is exacerbated by denuding steep slopeS.
95
Foreign companies seem unlikely to maintain environmental stan-
dards higher than the Soviet norm. American timber companies engage
in clearcutting despite large public protests in the United States, and
there is little reason to think that, without opposition of any kind, they
will nevertheless refrain from taking advantage of the lower Soviet
standards.
Further, the Soviet Union's loose regulatory enforcement system en-
ables environmentally destructive enterprises to ignore even the lax So-
viet standards. As one Soviet economist has observed, "[i]n the West...
such companies clean up after themselves only if forced to; however, the
87. Id. at 86.
88. B. Barr, Too Much Glasnost?, supra note 53, at 9.
89. Council of the Ministers of the USSR, Baikal Declaration (1990) (G. Davis transL)
[hereinafter Baikal Declaration].
90. B. Barr, Too Much Glasnost?, supra note 53, at 9.
91. Dembitz, Man Who Walks in the Woods Returns from the Siberian Forest, So.
Humbolt Life & Times, Jan. 2, 1990, at 7, col. 2.
92. B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 87.
93. B. Barr, Too Much Glasnost?, supra note 53, at 9.
94. Id,
95. See Baikal Declaration, supra note 89.
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USSR lacks strong laws to prevent them from doing as they please.",9 6
Western companies may even use the USSR to dump polluting technolo-
gies. A former chairman of Goskompriroda noted that "[c]ertain compa-
nies ... strive to get rid of equipment and technology no longer in
demand in the West." 97
Moreover, joint venture projects are likely to be less subject to regu-
latory enforcement than Soviet enterprises. Because of the economic
benefit it receives from joint ventures, the Soviet government has a fur-
ther interest in easing regulatory burdens for such firms. The North Ko-
rean logging operations at Brusnichii exemplify central government
reluctance to enforce joint venture conformity to existing law. The Ko-
rean operations in that region have encroached on a legally protected
nature preserve, and the preserve director has led a public campaign to
stop the logging; however, government officials overseeing the timber in-
dustry have not responded to the appeals. The agreement between the
Soviet Union and North Korea has thus been given precedence over both
local opposition and state law.98
Even if these obstacles to environmental regulation could be over-
come, the actual regulating or fining of violators is no easy matter. Since
the ruble is not a convertible currency, most trade and joint venture
agreements are made on a noncash basis. For example, the Tyndales
Production Association in Tynda, Amur Oblast, is a joint venture with a
North Korean timber company, whereby North Korea receives thirty-
nine percent of the cut timber, and the USSR sixty-one percent. When
popular protest revealed that the Koreans had overcut the tracts which
were assigned to them, the result was more cutting in the same tracts;
the Koreans could only pay their fines in timber, as there were no cur-
rency fines provided for in the joint venture agreement. 99
Although Soviet environmentalists generally prefer to shut down vi-
olating projects,1" this method of regulatory enforcement seems ill-
suited to joint ventures. Halting the operations of a foreign company
may present thorny international problems, as well as questions concern-
ing the disposition of previously made investments and project property.
96. W. Freeman, Environmental Opposition to Foreign Investment in the USSR (Nov.
22, 1989) (unpublished research memorandum for the U.S. Information Agency) (hereinafter
W. Freeman, Environmental Opposition].
97. Id. at n.17 (quoting PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTRO (No. 2) (1989).
98. See id. at 6-7.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Interview with W. Freeman, Analyst, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Wash-
ington, D.C. (Aug. 1, 1990).
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E. Obstacles to Citizen Oversight of Joint Ventures
The centralized production ministries generally broker joint venture
projects, often behind a veil of bureaucratic secrecy.101 There is no citi-
zen review process by which to assess the social and environmental con-
sequences of any project t3 2 nor is Goskompriroda consulted. Even the
Supreme Soviet, normally charged with regulating international aspects
of government sponsored activities, is bypassed in the process of approv-
ing joint ventures.1 3 Multinationals and the Soviet ministries are there-
fore unaccountable to local populations, and projects can be initiated
without any opportunity for citizens to protest because there may be no
advance knowledge of the project or its impact.I Moreover, citizens
have little capacity to monitor public operations or compel enforcement
of regulations once the projects are underway.105
Joint ventures would be regulated more effectively if citizen groups
had some input in how they were shaped. The agreements could then be
crafted to facilitate enforcement, and make regulatory fines practicable
and effective. One approach would be to include provisions in the agree-
ment that guarantee the ability of citizens to monitor operations. This
could involve providing monitoring equipment, as well as the required
disclosure of technical information regarding operations.
Another approach would be to require foreign enterprises to put up
a hard currency bond as insurance against environmentally damaging op-
erations.1 6 Additionally, any fines levied could go towards the purchase
of foreign pollution abatement and monitoring equipment; such equip-
ment is now largely unavailable because hard currency is allocated for
higher priority items.10 7 Foreign corporations might fear abuse of the
insurance bond through trumped up violations, but it is more likely that
the government's interest in promoting joint ventures would curb such
practices.
101. Katasonov, Capitalizing on Perestroika, EARTH ISLAND J., Spring 1990, at 41.
102. W. Freeman, Environmental Opposition, supra note 96, at 12-13.
103. Katasonov, supra note 101, at 41.
104. W. Freeman, Environmental Opposition, supra note 96, at 12.
105. IdL
106. Baikal Declaration, supra note 89.
107. E. Green, supra note 27, at 59.
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IV. THE FUTURE: LAND USE DECISIONS IN A TIME
OF CHANGE
A. Decentralization and Environmentalism
The Soviet Union is now in the sway of a massive movement toward
political and economic decentralization. Combined with a burgeoning of
grassroots environmental activism, we now see a convergence of political,
economic, and social forces that would seem to augur well for environ-
mental protection. This convergence, however, holds a threat as well as
a promise for the environment.
The opportunities for environmental protection are fairly clear. As
we have noted, past environmental successes have required the aid of
senior officials. Generally, opposition must become quite substantial
before the attention of such officials is gained. Decentralization of polit-
ical authority could mitigate these difficulties, since local officials tend to
be more responsive and easier to influence than distant authorities.
Decentralized decision-making holds promise for more appropri-
ately scaled, and hence less environmentally disruptive, projects. Forest
Ministry Chairman Isayev has proposed that the role of local forest man-
agement be strengthened.1"8 Because local authorities are more familiar
with and more responsive to the particular needs of a region, they should
be less tempted by huge development schemes. Local authorities are
more likely to have a deeply felt connection to the land and an interest in
its preservation. 1" Indeed, the pressure to stop the Northern Rivers pro-
ject came in part from local authorities opposed to the project's disas-
trous economic and environmental consequences. As we saw in the
Korean joint venture at Brusnichii, local authorities pressured the central
ministries to prevent timber cutting in the nature preserves.
B. Decentralization and Economics
Local political responsibility for the protection of resources seems to
offer the best promise for wise wilderness preservation and resource man-
agement, but the picture appears more ambiguous when local authorities
also have economic control of resources. Generally, when local popula-
tions are poised to reap the economic benefits of development, they seem
unable to maintain a long-term, environmentally sustainable vision of
their resources. For example, numerous local nonforestry ministries ac-
108. B. Barr, Too Much Glasnost?, supra note 53, at 8.




cept wood cut by "nomadic" Siberian loggers." 0 The forestry practices
of these local "independents," however, seem to be destroying the viabil-
ity of several large wood-processing complexes in Siberia."'
Local authorities may be tempted to sell resources in the name of
local economic interests. This temptation may compete with attempts to
set aside and preserve tracks of land as pristine wilderness, since there is
little incentive for local authorities, faced with local pressure for in-
creased material needs, to resist the development of these resources.
One timely solution would be to set aside as much Siberian open
space for preservation as possible. Soviet experts argue that the amount
of land devoted to nature preserved should be increased by five or six
times in the next ten years,112 and this goal could be pursued during the
decentralization process. Currently, there is no great need for unbridled
development. The material needs of Siberia, with its small population,
are much smaller than those of the rest of the USSR, and local authori-
ties now seem to favor increased protection of Siberian forests and other
natural resources.
11 3
In short, there is now a window of opportunity to preserve Siberia's
vast undeveloped land. Currently only about five percent of this land is
protected from exploitation either through preservation in a pristine state
(Zapovyednik), or designation as wildlife preserves (ZaposnikO. Expan-
sion of these areas could preserve vast tracts of wilderness that have
worldwide significance.
C. Land Preservation and Development in the United States
It seems unrealistic to hope that there will be no more exploitation
of Siberian lands and resources. Given the inevitability of development,
a new system of management to determine the wisest, most sensible, and
most environmentally benign methods of developing these lands and re-
sources will have to be devised.
In the United States, federal environmental regulations tend to be
more stringent than state or local legislation. This also tends to hold true
in the Soviet Union, where regional and Republic environmental laws are
often too vague to be useful.114 In the interests of insuring the careful
development of resources, thus minimizing pollution and protecting Sibe-
110. B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 91.
111. Id
112. Ryzhkov, The Size of Nature Reserves and Costs of Their Maintenance, 29 SoviET
GEo.RAPHY 918 (1988).
113. B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 228-33.
114. Peterson, supra note 7.
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ria's pristine wilderness, it is necessary to develop a system that enables
the central government to fashion broad resource protection policies.
This does not mean, however, that responsibility for environmental pro-
tection should be placed entirely with the central government. In fact,
the collaboration of the Soviet Union, the Russian Republic, and Siberian
local authorities will probably be necessary.
The variety of public land designations in the United States could be
imported to the Soviet Union to help serve as a guide to Siberian land
management. In the United States, as in the Soviet Union, some of the
federally owned lands are set aside as wilderness areas, where no devel-
opment of any kind is permitted.115 In national parks, all development is
prohibited unless it is related to recreational use, which includes accom-
modations for park visitors. 16 National wildlife refuges permit some de-
velopment,' 17 although at the moment the largest of these refuges, the
Alaska National Wildlife Refuge, is too remote for economically feasible
development, though a large increase in world oil prices is all that is
needed to make oil extraction economically feasible in this Alaskan
refuge. *
National forests under the control of the U.S. Forest Service contain
most of the timber on public lands. Sustained yield timber harvesting is
permitted in most of these lands.118 Finally, the Bureau of Land Man-
agement controls the remainder of the public lands, which are not desig-
nated national forests, wildlife refuges, parks, or wilderness-and a host
of development activities are permitted there, including mining, timber
harvesting, and oil and gas extraction.'
1 9
While most public lands are under federal protection in the United
States, several states and counties have reserved substantial public lands
as state parks, monuments, and wildlife preserves. These, too, could
serve as models for the Russian Republic in preserving Siberian open
space.
V. CONCLUSION
While the major question of who owns Sibe:dan land and resources
is being decided, central and local authorities should examine the experi-
115. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (Coggins & Wilkinson Supp. 1 1990).
116. See id. § lb.
117. Id. § 668dd(b)(1).
118. Id. § 528. Sustained yield is defined as "the achievement and maintenance In
perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources
of the national forests without impairment of the productivity of the land." Id, § 531(b).
119. See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (Coggins & Wilkinson Supp. I 1990).
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ence of other countries regarding the preservation and use of public lands
and resources. Hopefully those who make the decisions affecting Sibe-
rian land and resources will resist development pressures, and will pre-
serve the resources of these rare open spaces for the benefit of future
generations.
The development which does occur should aim to diversify local Si-
berian economies, and decrease the mining and exploitation of Siberian
resources. Such planning could have collateral economic benefits for the
USSR's Western Regions as well. Recent economic analyses suggest
that, because of transportation costs, the USSR's Western Regions' reli-
ance on Siberian timber is more costly than careful and selective harvest-
ing of the more proximate Ural timber supplies. 2 ° Above all, intensive
local processing and manufacture, and effective use of resources, should
be stressed. Joint ventures should be structured with an eye towards ful-
filling these goals. This would benefit both the local economies and the
environment.
120. B. BARR & K. BRADEN, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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